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RESEARCH
UP THE EMMITSBURG ROAD General Robert E. Lee's plan for the attack on July 2 on the Union southern flank Where Did Lee Want to Attack on July 2. During the Watergate scandal of the Nixon administration, two questions were asked trying to determine President Nixon's culpability. These questions were: 1. What did President Nixon know of the Watergate break in? 2. When did he know it? These questions can be rephrased and asked about General Robert E. Lee's knowledge of the Union position at Gettysburg on the morning of July 2. The rephrased questions would read: 1. Where did Lee think the Union army's left flank rested on the morning of July 2, 1863 and 2. When did he perceive this? Answering these questions is the only way to get a clear understanding of Lee's battle plan for the second day and would dispel the illogic apparent in Lee's original plan of attack. Lee's original plan for July 2 and the adjustments made later in the day by the First Corps commander, Lieutenant General James Longstreet, to his subordinate, Major General Lafayette McLaws, become intertwined and confuse many historians. The usual interpretation by historians of where Lee placed the Union line somewhere on Cemetery Ridge near the Pennsylvania Monument. Later in this article, the perceptions of Lee's original plan by historians Edwin Coddington, Douglas Southall Freeman and Harry Pfanz will be examined. Since Lee's and Longstreet's battle reports don't clearly differentiate between the two plans, sadly, the original battle plan might never be conclusively known. The plan, however, can be surmised from the position that General Lee instructed Longstreet to deploy the First Corps troops on the morning of July 2. Taking Lee's, Longstreet's and Major General Lafayette McLaws' statements together and information Lee received from a reconnaissance party, an argument can be advanced that gives an alternative to the accepted interpretation that the original attack plan was aimed at Cemetery Ridge. Considering all te facts to be presented in thus article, an alternative interpretation to the usual descriptions is, indeed, plausible and eliminates the illogical apparent in the usual interpretations. Lee might have thought the Union line was already on the Emmitsburg Road and McLaws' division was to move northward and attack the Union's left flank. The position of the Union left flank would probably have been somewhere between the Rogers and Corori houses. In Lee's mind, then, if McLaws could have reached the low ground to the south of the Peach Orchard, his division could have deployed unseen and when ready launched a devastating attack on the undefended Union left flank. Victory would have surely followed! To understand the reasoning behind this alternative interpretation, the reader must know the information Lee had on the morning of July 2. CAPTAIN SAMUEL JOHNSTON'S RECONNAISSANCE Because Major General James Ewell Brown (JEB) Stuart and the Southern cavalry had not yet rejoined the Army of Northern Virginia, General Lee was blind to the Union position on the morning of July 2. The cavalry would not reach the battlefield until late afternoon of July 2. Desperate for information about the Union position, Lee sent out a scouting party under the direction of Captain Samuel R. Johnston, an engineer on Lee's staff. Johnston accompanied by General Longstreet's engineer, Major John J. Clarke and a few escorts left the Southern headquarters around 4:00 a.m. for the assigned reconnaissance. The group traveled approximately the path that Longstreet's First Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia would, later in the day, take to reach the crest of Seminary Ridge on the right flank (south) of the Confederate army. Continuing across the Emmitsburg Road near the Peach Orchard, they moved to the base of Little Round Top and climbed the slope until they reached a spot where they had a "commanding view" of the area below. Leaving the hill, they then traveled past the ground where Hood's division of Longstreet's Corps would later deploy and where the Union cavalry fought on July 3. Turning back after they had proceeded for what Johnston considered to be "far enough" for the reconnaissance, the group returned to the Seminary area arriving around 7 a.m. Johnston found Lee sitting on a log talking to Generals Longstreet and A. P. Hill. Hill commanded the Confederate army's Third Corps. Lee's group was collected around a map and the commanding general was pointing to it when he spied Captain Johnston. Calling Johnston over, Lee requested Johnston to trace on the map the route the captain had taken. As Johnston traced his route, he presented Lee with startling information. Johnston showed the route the reconnaissance party had taken to reach Little Round Top. When Johnston pointed to the hill's location on the map and indicated that was the area he had reached, Lee looked surprised and said, "Did you get there?" Johnston, moreover, indicated the party had seen no Union troops except three or four cavalrymen passing up the Emmitsburg Road. Turning to Longstreet, Lee said to his subordinate, "I think you had better move on." Evidently, as Johnston assumed, Lee had started Longstreet's Corps on some plan of attack.1 Critics of Johnston's claim Lee's engineer never reached Little Round Top. They suggest other ground as the high ground the reconnaissance party actually reached, such as Big Round Top, Bushman's Hill, or even Devil's Den. Johnston's actual position is unimportant to understanding Lee's plan for Lee believed Johnston had reached the coveted high ground on the Union left and had found it unoccupied. From Johnston's information, Lee thought the Union line was shorter than it actually was and that no Union troops occupied the area of the Peach Orchard. MAJ. GEN. LAFAYETTE MCLAWS IDENTIFIES HIS PROPOSED POSITION OF ATTACK Lee's original plan was to attack the Union left flank and drive it back. Lieutenant General Ewell, commanding the army's Second Corps, meanwhile, was to demonstrated on the Union right. Hill's Corps would assist Longstreet's attack by sending Major General Richard Heron Anderson's division against the Union center. Anderson's attack would prevent Union reinforcements from being sent to either flank.2 By the orders Lee gave to Longstreet and McLaws, it can be assumed that Lee proposed an attack up the Emmitsburg Road. In the Southern Historical Society Papers, McLaws published a paper giving a description of a meeting he had with Lee.
McLaws paper continues describing a conversation with Longstreet along the march toward the Peach Orchard:
McLaws' Division was marching by the flank or a column of fours and facing to the left would bring them into Line of Battle perpendicular to the Emmitsburg Road. Since McLaws indicated that the place he was ordered to go was the area he later went to, it can be assumed that the area referred to was the Peach Orchard. McLaws later in the day attacked the Peach Orchard. South of the Peach Orchard, the ground falls off quickly which allowed Confederate troops in that area to deploy out of the view of any Union troops deployed along the Emmitsburg Road north of the Peach Orchard. While the area could be seen from Little Round Top, Johnston's reconnaissance revealed that it was not occupied by the Federals. From this position south of the Peach Orchard, McLaws would then have been in position to attack north along the Emmitsburg Road against the Union left flank, if the Union flank were on the road. This position, however, would not allow the McLaws' infantry to attack Union troops stationed on Cemetery Ridge. Since Union accounts show the Union position on or near Cemetery Ridge, to properly attack the Union left flank, McLaws' division would have had to advance past the Peach Orchard and move forward and straddle Cemetery Ridge in the area of Little Round Top. Yet, McLaws indicated that Lee wanted McLaws to form his position across the Emmitsburg Road. General John Bell Hood confirmed the attack was to be made along the Emmitsburg Road. Later when it was discovered that Major General Daniel Sickles had advanced his Third Corps to the Emmitsburg Road and occupied the area near the Peach Orchard, Longstreet had to adjust his plans. McLaws' infantry could no longer deploy in the low ground south of the Peach Orchard since Sickles now commanded that area. Longstreet, therefore, sent Hood's division southward to cross the Emmitsburg road and move northward with his left flank on the road and the right passing by the Round Tops. When Hood received these orders, he sent scouts to the area of the Round Tops. The scouts found the Union line rested upon Round Top but Hood's division "could march through an open woodland pasture around Round Top and assault the enemy in flank and rear . . . " Hood presented this information to Longstreet but was told that "Genl. Lee's orders are to attack up the Emmettsburg [sic] Road."4 The conclusion that can be taken from the conversation between Longstreet and McLaws and Hood's writings is Lee wanted to attack up the Emmitsburg Road from the area south of the Peach Orchard. That opportunity was taken from him when Sickles advanced his line from his position near Cemetery Ridge to the Emmitsburg Road. The reader must remember the meeting between Lee and McLaws was early morning of July 2. Sickles had not advanced yet. LEE DESCRIBES THE UNION POSITION If Lee thought the Union line were on Cemetery Ridge but not extended as far as the Round Tops, forming McLaws division south of the Peach Orchard and attack up the Emmitsburg Road certainly would be an exceedingly strange position. A movement north on the Emmitsburg Road would bare McLaws' right flank to any Union troops on Cemetery Ridge. This movement would be a mistake on Lee's part and would invite a Southern defeat. The deployment would be appropriate, however, if Lee wished to attack a Union force that he believed was deployed along the Emmitsburg Road. A study of Lee's battle reports indicates that the Union position ran from Cemetery Hill along the Emmitsburg Road but does not define the time for this Union position. His reports stated:
Lee's report of July 31 would seem to describe the Union position after Sickles had moved forward. It referenced Sickles' position along the Emmitsburg Road. If Sickles' position could be taken, it would allow the Southern artillery a platform from which the Southern guns could cooperate with the infantry in capturing the higher ground behind the Union line. His January 1864 report is confusing. Excluding skirmishers, the Union line while it did rest upon both Cemetery and Culp's Hill never extended from Cemetery Hill and along the Emmitsburg Road. Rather, it ran along the crest of Cemetery Ridge. When Sickles moved forward there was no connection between Sickles' right flank and the Union troops on Cemetery Ridge. Sickles' right flank was to the south of the Codori buildings. These buildings sit along the Emmitsburg Road near the center of the Union line. Lee, might have meant that Cemetery Ridge paralleled the Emmitsburg Road. He, however, in the January 1864 report identifies two positions that the Union occupied. The first Union position was high ground along the Emmitsburg Road. The second Union position was on a steep ridge behind the first position. This steep ridge must be Cemetery Ridge. The high ground along the Emmitsburg Road must have been the ridge on which the road runs. One of the statements that support the view that the Union line was already on the Emmitsburg Road was Lee's statement that the success of the attack was in doubt. He stated the attack was to "endeavor to gain a position." [Emphasis added] If Lee were viewing only a skirmish line, gaining the ridge would not be a problem for the Confederate infantry which could swat away the skirmishers like gnats. Lee, therefore, had to believe the Union line along the ridge was in enough strength to resist the attack and make the outcome in doubt. Sickles' advanced line would have met this expectation. Since there is no time frame, it cannot be determined if Lee is discussing Sickles' advanced position or some earlier Union position along the Emmitsburg Road. There can be only two answers as to why Lee thought it would be a fight to obtain the prized position of the Peach Orchard. The first is that there were Union troops already at the Peach Orchard or nearby, and the second is Lee thought the Union could advance from Cemetery Ridge to contest the Peach Orchard's occupation by the Southern forces. The second answer is weak for the Federal soldiers would have to advance across fairly open ground to attack the Longstreet's men at the Emmitsburg Road. Meade and his generals would not have time to react and organize a counter strike to regain this higher ground. The Union men, moreover, would be traveling from the area of the present day Pennsylvania Monument, which is a good estimate of where the Southerners thought the Union left would have rested. This counterattack would take time. Since the Confederates would have already been in position on the Emmitsburg Road, it would have allowed Longstreet's men to erect a strong defensive line. While Lee and Longstreet would have relished the Federal troops having to attack an established Southern position on a commanding ridge, the Southern position conversely would have had a dampening effect on the Union spirits. Attacking uphill against a strong defensive position would not have been appealing to the Union generals. The Union generals would certainly have remembered the Battle of Fredericksburg. While the slope from Cemetery Ridge toward the Emmitsburg Road was not as steep as at Fredericksburg, it still was uphill toward the Peach Orchard. It seems most logical then, Lee thought Union troops were already on the Emmitsburg Road. But, were these soldiers Sickles men or other Union troops? LONGSTREET'S REPORT CLEARS AWAY THE CONFUSION If Lee's report does not clarify the Union position, Longstreet's report gives a better understanding of the Union position. Coddington claimed that Longstreet started his flanking movement somewhere around noon. If noon is used as the time for the movement, Longstreet's report seems to indicate the Confederates knew of a strong Union presence on the Emmitsburg Road on the morning of July 2 but not extended as far south as the Peach Orchard. McLaws' infantry did not discover the Union troops on the Emmitsburg Road when they crested Seminary Ridge later in the day but rather found that the Union troops had moved to the left and commanded the area for McLaws' deployment. The area south of the Peach Orchard was no longer available to them.7 Longstreet's report stated:
Longstreet's made this assessment of the Union troops being on the Emmitsburg Road before he had started his corps on the march toward the left flank of the Union army. His report continued:
This section of Longstreet's report clearly showed that the Confederates believed that the Union line was already on the Emmitsburg Road before Sickles' moved forward. HISTORIANS HAVE MISUNDERSTOOD THE PLAN OF ATTACK ON JULY 2 Some historians believing the Union line was on Cemetery Ridge and knowing of the proposed attack up the Emmitsburg Road had to invent a turning movement from the Emmitsburg Road toward Cemetery Ridge. Edwin Coddington in his excellent book, The Gettysburg Campaign, A Study in Command, stated that Johnston's "reconnaissance seemed to confirm his [Lee's] assumption that the Union line extended only from Cemetery Hill to the upper part of the ridge which he [Lee] could observe directly." In another section, he states that all references to Lee's battle plans for day two are cryptic and misleading. Coddington in reference to Lee's reports argues that "They read as if Lee had designed his operations so as to attack the Federal lines where they were finally located later in the day, instead of where they actually were at the time he formulated his plans. . . . The Emmitsburg Road marked a part of the Union line only after General [Andrew] Humphreys advanced his division to it about 4.00 P. M., more than four hours after Lee issued his order to Longstreet.8 The problem with Coddington's interpretation is twofold. First the references for his conclusion are Lee's reports mentioned above. Neither of Lee's two reports was of sufficient clarity to arrive at Coddington's conclusions. Secondly, the position Lee described in his January 1864 report, as discussed above, never existed. Coddington, rather, used information gained from Union reports as to where the Union line rested. He missed the point with his analysis. It is not where the Union line actually rested but where Lee thought the Union line ran. It is immaterial where the Union line actually ran. Coddington makes the mistake often committed by historians of using information that was not available to the participants. On the morning of July 2, Lee had no idea where the Union left flank rested. That was one reason Lee ordered Johnston on the reconnaissance. Coddington, secondly, stated that the plan of attack was to be in two stages. The first stage was to capture the high ground o0n which the Emmitsburg Road rested. The second stage was to use this captured ground as a platform for artillery when the infantry continued toward Cemetery Ridge. He indicated that Lee's plan called for an oblique movement to attack the Union forces on Cemetery Ridge. There would be no other way to attack the Union position if Longstreet's men were driving north on the Emmitsburg Road. A great right wheel would have to be taken somewhere along the attack route so that the Confederate infantry could face the defenders. The great southern historian, Douglas Southhall Freeman in his history of Lee's army, Lee's Lieutenants, adhered to the concept of an oblique attack on Cemetery Ridge from the Emmitsburg Road. There is no reference for this idea of an oblique attack. He correctly indicated that Lee believed the Union did not occupy the dominating ground of Little Round Top.9 His biography of Lee further defined what Freeman thought Lee's plan was for July 2. Freeman states, "Lee thought the Union line was on Cemetery Ridge but much shorter than it was in reality. Longstreet was to move up the Emmitsburg Road to capture two high pieces of ground that could support artillery positions. One was the Peach Orchard and the other west of big Round Top. From these positions, Lee could launch his oblique attack on the lower section of Cemetery Ridge and have the attack supported by artillery. The oblique attack would allow the Confederates to avoid enfilade artillery fire from Cemetery Hill. Capturing the lower end of Cemetery Ridge would in turn allow the southern artillery to enfilade the Union line along Cemetery Ridge."10 In both of the books by Freeman, there are no footnotes to indicate from where the idea of an oblique attack came. Both Coddington and Freeman invented the oblique attack since a northern movement along the Emmitsburg Road with the Union army situated on Cemetery Ridge would be illogical. As stated before, an advance up the Emmitsburg Road in this situation would have bared the southern right flank to attack. Both authors had to avoid this piece of illogic, feeling Lee could not have ordered such an attack. They had to have the Confederate line turning toward Cemetery Ridge to protect the Southern right flank from enfilade fire. Coddington and Freeman had to develop this idea of an oblique attack since both are wedded to the idea that Lee thought the Union line ran along Cemetery Ridge. Referring to Lee's battle reports, however, no reference to an oblique attack can be found. There is nothing, moreover, in McLaws writings to indicate an oblique attack. Lee, Longstreet and McLaws, however, did not talk about an oblique attack. Coddington and Freeman probably arrived their conclusion by studying the Union reports and knowing the actual position of the Federal troops.11 Harry Pfanz in his monumental work on Longstreet's second day attack correctly states that Lee wanted Longstreet to place Major General Lafayette McLaws' division perpendicular to the Emmitsburg Road hidden in the low ground south of the Peach Orchard. Later, he accurately stated Lee's first objective was to capture the high ground between the two ridges, Cemetery and Seminary. Pfanz concludes that "Hood's and McLaws' divisions were to envelope the enemy left and drive it in; . . ." Pfanz correctly claims that Lee's battle plan "was based on Confederate perceptions of the Federal situation at the time that the plan was imparted and not on the reality of enemy dispositions at the time of the attack." His work is silent, however, as to the exact position that Lee thought the Union flank rested.12 Pfanz, also, used the time for Longstreet's departure as shortly after noon. He indicates that Lee wanted McLaws to attack the Peach Orchard which is true only after McLaws discovered Sickles advanced line. This statement confuses the attack plan with the later position of the Union line after Sickles took up the advanced line. In fact, if Lee wanted to attack the left of the Union line on Cemetery Ridge, it would be easier to make an oblique movement from a position facing the ridge rather than perpendicular to it. The latter position would require a wheel of almost 90 degrees to bring the attacking line into position. Facing the ridge would require a wheeling movement less than a 90-degree. For a limited number of men, say a regiment, there may be no significant difference between the two movements but when a division of 6,000 men, executes a wheel the lesser distance is preferable. Multiplying the number of men in a line also multiplies the potential for gaps to be created during the wheel thereby allowing the possibility of a Union counterattack on an exposed flank. THE PEACH ORCHARD WAS NO LONGER AVAILABLE FOR A SOUTHERN DEPLOYMENT When McLaws' division reached the crest of Seminary Ridge they found Sickles troops where they did not expect them, occupying the Peach Orchard, the ground that was supposed to hide McLaws men while the Southerners deployed . . . McLaws continued:
As I have already stated, General Longstreet had informed me just previous to my arriving in view of the enemy's position, that I would arrive entirely on their flank, and he wished me to march into my position in column of companies, and when well on the enemy's flank to face or form line to the left and march down upon them. 13 [Emphasis added] This last statement by McLaws would not be true if the Peach Orchard was the targeted area for McLaws' deployment and Sickles was already there. Because Sickles moved his corps to the Emmitsburg Road, it required a change in plans for the southern attack. It is at this point that history becomes clouded and the original plan merges with the actual plan of attack. Now the Peach Orchard must be attacked and not just occupied. The writings of Lee, Longstreet and McLaws then suggest that the answers to the two questions mentioned above are:
It may never be adequately explained where Lee thought the Union left flank was on the morning of July 2, 1863, or whether it rested on the Emmitsburg Road or Cemetery Ridge. But General Lee was a better tactician than to bear his right flank to attack on moving north on the Emmitsburg Road. Lee's and Longstreet's silence on an oblique attack in their reports surely casts doubts on any interpretation that mentions such an attack. Rather Lee thought advancing "Up the Emmitsburg Road" would have advanced the Southerners to victory! Paul Clark Cooksey
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