Neither Brigadier General William Morris (151st NY brigade commander) nor 151st NY commander Lt. Col. Erwin Bowen wrote a report on the Mine Run campaign; at least, neither's report is included in the O.R.s. Presented below are the Mine Run reports of Morris's superiors: Third Division commander Brigadier General Joseph Carr, and Third Corps commander Major General William French.

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O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXIX/1 [S# 48]
NOVEMBER 26-DECEMBER 2, 1863.--The Mine Run (Virginia) Campaign
No. 67. --Report of Brig. Gen Joseph B. Carr, U. S. Army, commanding Third Division.

NEAR BRANDY STATION, VA.,
December 4, 1863.

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of the part taken by my division during the recent operations of the Third Corps, from November 23 to this date:

On November 23, orders were received from headquarters Third Army Corps, directing the command to move next morning, November 24, at daylight, the Second Division to be in advance, Third Division in the center, and First Division in rear, the column to march left in front. At 6.30 a.m., November 24, a copy of a telegram from headquarters Army of the Potomac was received, through headquarters Third Corps, directing that, owing to the unfavorable state of the weather, the troops should not leave their camps until further orders. At 6 a.m., November 26, orders were received from headquarters Third Corps directing the command to move as directed in circular from the same headquarters dated November 23.

The command moved shortly after 7 a.m. Just before starting a detail of 200 men was made from the division, to serve as a guard for the corps train. The division crossed Mountain Run at Ross' Mills at 9.45 a.m., and reached the Rapidan, near Jacobs' Mills, at 2 p.m. Crossed the river at 4 p.m., and was directed by Major-General French to follow the Second Division, and bivouac for the night between it and the First Division, and to picket the front strongly. The march was continued after crossing the river for about 3 miles, when it was discovered that the Second Division had taken the wrong road. The command was countermarched, returning to within a mile of the river, and bivouacking for the night.

At 7 a.m., November 27, the march was resumed on the road to Robertson's Tavern, the orders from corps headquarters being to follow the Second Division closely and to throw out strong flanking parties on the right flank. The column moved slowly forward making frequent halts. At 9.10 a.m. a few musket shots were heard in front. At 11.25 halted on the edge of a field on the left of the road, and about 3 miles from Jacobs' Mills. At 12.30 the firing in front became quite brisk. About 2.30 p.m. the division was ordered up to take position on the left of the Second Division, and to connect, if possible, with the right of the Second Corps. The division, marching left in front, filed into the woods on the left of the road. I directed General Morris, commanding First Brigade, to connect with the left of the Second Division; Colonel Keifer, with the Second Brigade, to form on the left of the First, and Colonel Smith, with the Third Brigade, to continue the line on the left of the Second.

General Morris, on moving up to connect with the Second Division, found the enemy posted behind a fence on the crest of a hill in his front. I ordered him to charge and drive them from it, which he did, driving the enemy through the fields beyond. This position was held by our troops until the close of the engagement. The troops had barely time to take the positions assigned them when the engagement became general along the entire line. The enemy made repeated attempts to advance in front of the brigades of General Morris and Colonel Keifer, but were repulsed each time with heavy loss.

Colonel Smith, commanding Third Brigade, failed to retain his position on the left of the Second Brigade, assigning as a reason the difficult nature of the ground on which he had to move his troops and the severity of the enemy's fire, though his report of casualties shows his loss to be trifling. Shortly before sundown, the ammunition of the men being nearly exhausted, I requested General Birney, commanding First Division, who had moved up to my support, to relieve my line to enable my men to refill their cartridge boxes. The brigades of General Morris and Colonel Keifer were then withdrawn, the First Division taking their place. I massed the two brigades above named about 200 yards in rear of the line of battle; they were supplied with ammunition and held in readiness for another advance. Darkness coming on, however, the firing entirely ceased. The enemy withdrew from our front, leaving their dead on the field.

At 3.15 a.m., November 28, I received orders from headquarters Third Corps to withdraw my command to the position they occupied before the advance was made on the afternoon of the 27th; also to report, on my way back, to the major-general commanding the corps. On reporting as directed, General French ordered me to follow with my command in rear of the Sixth Corps. I found the narrow road on which they were moving filled with their artillery, and ammunition and ambulance trains, and was delayed over an hour waiting for them to pass.

I moved on, in rear of the trains of the Sixth Corps, at 6.30 a.m., halting at 8 a.m. on the edge of a large field in which part of the Sixth Corps was massed. Moved on again at 1 p.m., following the Second Division, the First Division being in advance. Halted again about a mile southwest of Robertson's' Tavern. Moved again at 4.10 p.m., taking position at sundown on the left of the First Division on the east side of Mine Run, threw out pickets, and bivouacked for the night. My command remained in the above position all next day, November 29. In the early part of the day, I was ordered by General French to hold my command in readiness to make an assault on the enemy's works in my front. I made the necessary disposition of the troops, but the day passed without the assault being made.

At 12.30 a.m., November 30, I received orders from headquarters of the corps to move with my division at 2 a.m. and report to Major-General Warren on the plank road. I reported as directed, and was conducted by a staff officer to the position assigned me, on the right of the Second Division, Third Corps, on the west side of Mine Run, my right resting on the plank road. I was told by General Warren that in the attack about to be made I should begin the movement by pushing through the thick wood in my front, my arrival on the other side of it to be the signal for the advance of the rest of the line over the comparatively clear ground on my left. I deployed a sufficient number of skirmishers and made every preparation for the intended attack. About this time the pickets of the Second Corps were withdrawn from my front, no notice having been given me of the fact.

In advancing the skirmishers to take the line just vacated by them a sharp skirmish ensued, resulting in a loss to us of 3 men killed and 4 wounded. My division remained in position until 12.30 p.m., when I was ordered by General Warren to report back to General French. I returned, and took my former position at 3 p.m.

At 10.45 a.m., December 1, received orders to hold my command in readiness to move at a moment's notice. The division marched at 6 p.m., but was delayed nearly three hours waiting for the passage of the trains and artillery. I crossed the Rapidan with my command at Culpeper Ford at 3.30 a.m., December 2, and halted about 1 mile from the river.

At noon on the 1st, I was ordered to send a strong brigade to report to General Gregg at the old Wilderness Tavern, at the intersection of the turnpike and Germanna plank road. The Third Brigade, Colonel Smith commanding, was detailed for that purpose. Colonel Smith reported as directed, and rejoined the division on the afternoon of the 2d.

My command moved from its bivouac near Culpeper Ford at 2 p.m., December 2, halted again at 4.30 p.m., resumed the march at 1 a.m., December 3, and reached its present position near Brandy Station at 6 a.m.

In conclusion, I would say that it affords me great pleasure to make honorable mention of the following officers who came under my immediate notice for their cool, intrepid, and gallant conduct on the field during the engagement on the 27th of November, namely: Brigadier-General Morris, commanding First Brigade, Colonel Keifer, commanding Second Brigade; Colonel Horn, Sixth Maryland Volunteers, Colonel Truex, Fourteenth New Jersey Volunteers, and Col. M. R. McClennan, commanding One hundred and thirty-eighth Pennsylvania Volunteers, the latter of whom was wounded.

I was much gratified with the conduct of my division; both officers and men performed their duty manfully, and the States they represent may justly feel proud of their bearing on the occasion.

I am under many obligations to the members of my staff for their assistance both in the field and on the march, and would particularly mention Lieut. James Johnson, acting assistant adjutant-gen-eral; Maj. P. Vredenburgh, jr., acting assistant inspector-general, and Lieut. C. C. Jones, aide-de-camp.

I inclose herewith the reports of brigade commanders and list of casualties.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOS. B. CARR,
Brigadier-General.

Lieut. Col. O. H. HART,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Inclosure.]

Report of Casualties in the Third Division, Third Army Corp,
during the recent movement, November 26-December 3.

O - Officers.
M - Men.
T - Total

Brigade	Killed			Wounded			Missing			Aggregate
	O	M	T	O	M	T	O	M	T
First	1	31	32	1	151	152	1	1	2	186
Second	1	32	33	7	137	144	...	...	...	177
Third	...	6	6	1	30	31	2	5	7	44
Total	2	69	71	9	318	327	3	6	9	407

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O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXIX/1 [S# 48]
NOVEMBER 26-DECEMBER 2, 1863.--The Mine Run (Virginia) Campaign

No. 42. --Reports of Maj. Gen. William H. French, U S. Army, commanding Third Army Corps.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD ARMY CORPS,
December 3, 1863.

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of this date in reference to the Third Army Corps not effecting a junction at Robertson's Tavern on the 26th instant.

I shall prepare a full statement regarding the march made by the Third Corps on the 26th instant and of the battle it was obliged to fight on the 27th, which enabled it to effect a junction on the following morning early; in the meantime I will anticipate my report by stating--

1. The position of the pontoon bridge was such that on the opposite side of Jacobs' Ford, on the Rapidan, the banks were so precipitous that my artillery had to be sent round by Germanna Ford, over an almost impassable road, so that but two batteries joined me on the morning of the 27th.
   
   
2. That without a guide the head of the column lost its road, and had to retrograde on the evening of the 26th, and the country to be reconnoitered.
   
   
3. On the morning of 27th, when the right road was supposed to have been found, the enemy were discovered in great strength and in line of battle to oppose the march.
   
   
4. That I had to choose whether to retreat or give battle. I chose the latter, which I did successfully, engaging with my whole corps Johnson's and Rodes' divisions of Ewell's corps. The battle lasted until 7 p.m. that day. Early on the 28th, the enemy were found to have retired, leaving their dead and wounded on the field on this and opposite side of the Raccoon Ford road, near Jones' Cross-Roads. I then immediately took up the line of march and came up with the Sixth Corps near Robertson's Tavern at 9 a.m. on the 28th, at which hour I sent to you a dispatch.
   

A full investigation of the operations of this corps will not reflect discredit upon it, and I hope to be able to present them in such a manner as will satisfy the general commanding.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

WM. H. FRENCH,
Major-General of Volunteers.

Major-General HUMPHREYS,
Chief of Staff.

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HEADQUARTERS THIRD ARMY CORPS,
December 4, 1863.

GENERAL: In continuation of my succinct note of yesterday in acknowledgment of your call for an explanation of the reasons why my corps did not form a connection with the corps of Major-General Warren at Robertson's Tavern at the time it was expected, I have the honor to report that on the 22d ultimo I received a telegraphic dispatch from headquarters: of the army saying that the general commanding desired to see the corps commanders at 1.30 o'clock on the following day, at which time I received the first intelligence that the army was to move against the enemy, crossing the Rapidan by Jacobs', Germanna, and the lower fords. Anticipating by this telegram a movement, I had previously issued orders by which my corps would lose no time when the final orders were given.

Immediately upon being notified of the route which my corps was to take, I sent a topographer and 6 mounted men to discover and examine the roads, in order that they might act as guides when the column was to move. I also directed General Prince, whose division was to lead, to send an aide-de-camp over this route, in order that he might report its state and get such information as would enable him to go directly forward whenever he was set in motion. I also directed that all the pioneers of General Carr's division should report to him, so that, in conjunction with his own, a large working force would be thrown upon the road, making such repairs as it was found to require. I further directed that these working parties should take with them their rations and knapsacks so that they should not return further, that the work should be kept up on the road during the night. These instructions were in writing.

The order to march was for 6 a.m. on the 24th. In consequence of the storm on the night of the 23d, the movement ordered for the 24th was suspended. On the evening of the 23d, I received a communication from General Prince, in which he stated that he had sent staff officers to ascertain the route to Jacobs' Mills, to obtain information how to get there. He also stated that it would be futile to attempt it without a good familiar guide, adding:

_{I have not met with any one better acquainted with that region than Major-General Warren, and he says it would be flat absurdity to attempt it without such a guide.}

He, Prince, also reported that he had put the pioneers over the road from Brandy Station to Ross' Mills.

On the 25th ultimo, at 9 p.m., the following dispatch was received from headquarters of the army:

_{Corps and other independent commanders will have their respective commands in readiness, to march at 6 a.m. to-morrow morning; further orders will be given at 5 a.m. or earlier.}

At 4.30 a.m. on the 26th, I sent an aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Newbury, to General Prince, inquiring "if he had received the preparatory order?" directing him "to put his command under arms immediately," and inquiring "if he knew the road?" This order was delivered at 5 a.m. General Prince replied "that he had received the preparatory order, but did not know the road, and asked for a guide." I sent this request of General Prince to headquarters of the army.

At about 5.20 a.m. of same day, the order to carry out the instructions of the 23d was received, which as soon as copied was sent by aide-de-camp to division commanders; that to General Prince was taken by Lieutenant Ruhl, who states that he reached General Prince in thirty minutes, arriving there a few minutes after 6 a.m.

At 7.45 a.m. I received a report that the rear of the Second Division was a mile beyond its camp. Having now seen the Third Division put in motion, I moved forward my headquarters, overtook the rear of the Second Division, and crossed Mountain Run, moved forward to Jacobs' Ford, arrived there with the head of the column at 11.55 a.m. General Prince had preceded the column and was reconnoitering the ford. I gave him orders to carry out the arrangements to cross the ford. The enemy were showing themselves in some small force on the opposite side, and reports had come to me from General Prince that a body of infantry was seen in the skirts of the woods, and also from the signal officer that he saw a section of guns. It therefore became necessary to act with a due amount of caution. I accordingly ordered up two batteries of artillery to be placed in position, a regiment of infantry deployed, and then the pontoon train, all of which occupied a certain portion of time, as the approach to the ford was through a narrow country road, allowing but one carriage to pass at once. As soon, however, as the pontoons were brought up, not a moment was lost in launching the boats and throwing a regiment of infantry across. At the same time cavalry crossed at the ford. The bridge was then laid and the troops, which had been massed in the front and rear of my column, moved across with great rapidity, with the exception of the artillery, which, in consequence of the precipitous banks on the opposite side, it was deemed impracticable to cross.

While at the ford I received a dispatch from headquarters of the army, dated there at 1 p.m., stating that my delay in reaching the river had retarded the operations of General Warren more than two hours and calling for explanation. I stated in my reply that my corps had 4 miles farther to march than General Warren. I will now state, in addition, that the selection of the place of crossing, for which I am not at all responsible, was of such a nature as to require the greatest exertions on my part to get over as rapidly as I did. Another dispatch from headquarters Army of the Potomac, dated 3 p.m., directed that--

_{I should not move forward farther from the river than to clear the way for General Sedgwick, until he comes up and crosses.}

This dispatch also charged that my artillery delayed that corps, the Sixth, by being stuck at the crossing at Mountain Run. An additional reason for the delay of my artillery was given by Captain Randolph, chief of artillery of this corps, that the trains of the headquarters Army of the Potomac blocked up the road, checking the advance.

I reported the impracticability of crossing artillery at Jacobs' Ford, and received orders, dated 4.30 p.m., headquarters Army of the Potomac, to send my artillery to cross at Germanna. In consequence of the bad state of the roads between the two fords on both sides of the river only one of my batteries got through that night, and another after I had marched on the morning of the 27th. The guide who was sent to me with this dispatch was given to General Prince, who renewed the march at daylight on the 27th.

At 8.30 a.m. on the 27th, I directed Major Norvell, assistant adjutant-general, to go to General Prince and find out whether he was on the right road, and whether he communicated with General Warren. General Prince replied that he did not know whether he was on the right road or not, and that he had not communicated with General Warren, but had sent a reconnoitering party to try and do it; that a squadron of cavalry had been advanced up the Raccoon Ford road and encountered a cavalry picket of the enemy, which, after some skirmishing, was driven in.

At 9.30 1 ordered Major Norvell with an escort and an aide-de-camp to return to the front, and report to me when General Prince had communicated with General Warren. General Prince reported that he had communicated with General Warren, and that he, General Warren, had sent him word that he understood his (Prince's) position perfectly. At the same time General Prince also reported that he had withdrawn the cavalry, as it had developed a large force of the enemy.

From these various delays, and the reports received from my staff officers, I became satisfied that the head of my column had struck the Raccoon Ford road, near the enemy's intrenched position on Mine Run, which fact was fully confirmed during the subsequent battle, by the heavy artillery, which enfiladed my line. I therefore determined to throw my line forward, deploying to my left, having in view a connection with Warren on my left. I communicated that fact to the general commanding the army.

About the time my leading division was deployed, it came in contact with the skirmishers of the enemy, a large column of whom was moving down the Raccoon Ford road, toward Robertson's Tavern. Deploying another division on the left of this, it also became engaged, and for over an hour the whole of this line was fiercely attacked. I now ordered my remaining division (the First) into position, bringing up my artillery on the right, thus attacking the enemy with my whole force, driving him back across the Raccoon Ford road, when at dusk the fighting gradually ceased, my line having advanced over the battle-field beyond the enemy's dead and wounded. In the course of that night, the right road to Robertson's Tavern having been discovered by engineer officers from army headquarters, the Sixth Corps, which was a mile and a half in the rear of my line of battle, was ordered to proceed to Robertson's Tavern, take position on the right of Warren, directing me to join whenever I could.

It having been reported that the enemy had fallen back, at daylight I moved to the road taken by the Sixth Corps, and following, overtook it 1 mile from Robertson's Tavern, at 9 a.m., where I reported my arrival to army headquarters.

Since receiving the call for this statement, General Prince has been called upon by me for a report, and states that----

_{At 6.30 a.m. the order to move was received. I left my quarters with my staff at ten minutes past 7. At about five minutes past 8 the last brigade of my division left its camp ground. I should say the head of my column moved at half-past 7.}

By this it will be seen (by the reports of my aides-de-camp and General Prince) that although he received the preparatory order in due time, he lost an hour from the time he received the order of execution, for which loss he has assigned no reason. That, in connection with his habitual slowness of movement, as exhibited in his preparation for crossing the ford, and the want of a guide after crossing the ford to conduct the column upon the route which was subsequently followed (but which was not designated on the map furnished for my guidance, the roads marked down there being entirely wrong and calculated to mislead), the imperfect reconnaissance which caused Jacobs' Ford to be selected as a place of crossing, and the subsequent unavoidable contact with the enemy, resulting in a serious engagement, are the causes to which are attributable the inability of the Third Corps to arrive at Robertson's Tavern sooner than it did.

I have now given you the "full explanation" which you have called for of all the facts and circumstances which in any way bear upon the causes of the delays and failures referred to. Had your communication been simply confined to calling from me this statement, my duty would here have ended, but it has been thought proper to state that--

_{Through the delays and failures specified, an opportunity was lost of attacking the enemy before he had concentrated, and that this had a powerful influence upon the result of the movements of this army.}

Now, I assert that without losing an unnecessary moment the enemy was attacked, and in very large force, before he had concentrated. That General Warren, whom your dispatches to me reported as in the presence of the enemy during that day, had the same opportunity, while my corps was engaging them, to have done the same thing.

That during the engagement prisoners were taken from Rodes' and Johnson's divisions in my front, showing that I was fighting two-thirds of Ewell's corps, and that within supporting distance of General Warren, who was within sound of my guns. Had he thought proper to have made a vigorous attack upon those in front of him, my opinion is that the result of the movements of this army might have been entirely different, but that confining himself to one single idea, rejecting the vicissitudes of a march resulting from obstacles over which the best generalship may sometimes have no control, his movements were made my objective point regardless of the rules and principles which all experience shows are necessary to success.

I claim that from the moment I met the enemy my order was executed; that the junction with General Warren was then made, as intended by the general commanding the army; that this corps fought the enemy and defeated him, and had the battle been fought by the Second Corps against those troops in its front, and had it succeeded, as I believe it would have done (in conjunction with the operations of the Sixth Corps, known to have been within supporting distance), the occasion for this report would not have arisen.

I furthermore declare that the position assigned to me on the left of the line of battle on the 28th, when I had reported at Robertson's Tavern, not only was outflanked by the enemy's line, but that the plank road running perpendicular to it would have obliged me to leave a strong portion of my corps to protect my guns and trains exposed to the enemy's attack during my advance upon works 1 mile in my front. These reasons influenced my opinion as to the injudiciousness of attacking, and my doubt of the success which would attend it as far as my position was concerned.

All the corps commanders, on the council on the evening of the 28th, also gave adverse opinion, upon what grounds I do not remember. The general commanding there stated his previous want of information of the topography of the country, and called upon corps commanders for suggestions regarding a new mode of attack. I proposed to fall back and take a line of battle toward the fords, inducing the enemy to leave the formidable heights and attack us.

Major-General Warren-proposed to take a light column and gain the enemy's rear, and distract him while the remainder of the army made an assault on his front. The major-general commanding assented to this proposition, and added to the Second Corps a division of the Sixth Corps, in all about 18,000 men, which moved at daylight on the 29th.

On the evening of that day, I received a dispatch from the major-general commanding renewing to me the question as to an assault upon the enemy on my front, and as matters had not changed, as far as I was informed, since my verbal opinion of the night before, I gave the same views over my own signature I had then given.

Simultaneous with this dispatch, at 7. 30 p.m., another was received, requesting my immediate presence at headquarters of the army. I followed up my dispatch, arriving there shortly after it, when, to my astonishment, I found there Major-General Warren, whom I had supposed to be on his march to the enemy's rear. It subsequently appeared that so far from making the proposed detour, he had quietly marched up the lank road and taken position on my left General Meade then informed me that he had changed his plan of attack, and taken two of my divisions and given them to General Warren, in consequence of the note above alluded to, making that officer's force about 28,000 men.

The attack was then ordered for the following morning at 8 a.m., myself with one division in the center, and Sedgwick with 18,000 men on the right. At that hour the attack began, and after my first line of skirmishers had advanced so far as to drive the enemy from his first line of rifle-pits, taking some prisoners, I received your dispatch to--

_{Cease firing, to suspend operations, and to be extremely cautious; that the attack on the right and left would probably not be made.}

I withdrew the column of attack.

The reports of division commanders have not yet been received. They will, however, be forwarded as early as practicable.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. H. FRENCH,
Major-General of Volunteers.

Maj. Gen. A. A. HUMPHREYS,
Chief of Staff.

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HEADQUARTERS THIRD ARMY CORPS,
Near Brandy Station, December 14, 1863.

GENERAL: On the 7th instant, I had the honor to inclose the reports of the division commanders and the chief of artillery of this corps.

My own report had already been transmitted, without, however, giving the details of the engagement of the 27th ultimo, at Jones' Cross-Roads, near the Raccoon Ford road. I now respectfully submit it for the information of the major-general commanding.

On the 26th ultimo, with the exception of one brigade, which was detached to guard the approach from Mitchell's Ford, and the artillery and trains, which had been directed to follow by general orders, the Third Corps had crossed the Rapidan near Jacobs' Ford.

Besides the impracticability of ascending the steep banks, which was mentioned in my previous report, the engineer in charge of the construction of the pontoon train found that he was one boat too short to lay the bridge, and was therefore necessitated to construct a trestle to supply its place, which, besides occasioning great delay, made it hazardous to cross heavy wagons. A bridge had also to be made over a wide ditch on the south side of the river. By authority, the artillery was sent round by way of Germanna Ford, and three of the batteries only joined me on the 27th, two early in the morning and the other in the course of the day. The remaining five batteries joined the reserve artillery, and proceeded to near Roberto son's Tavern, under the direction of Captain Randolph, chief of artillery.

The column was ordered to be put in motion at daylight on the 27th (order annexed, marked A). From reports received from the general commanding the Second Division (annexed, marked B and C), I was satisfied that I was in the immediate vicinity of the enemy; that my movements from the time I arrived at the ford had been reported by the vedettes found posted there, and I therefore directed such dispositions of my column as would be able to frustrate any flank attack which might be meditated. After the corps had moved several miles upon the route which had been taken by the commander of the Second Division on approaching the Raccoon Ford road, every reconnaissance made by my cavalry developed the enemy's pickets flanking that road toward Bartlett's Mills on my right and Robertson's Tavern on my left. The direction in which my head of column advanced to the Raccoon Ford road intersected the latter intermediately between those two places, about 2 miles from either.

The instructions for the movement of the corps from headquarters Army of the Potomac, dated November 23, 1863, were:

_{The Third Corps, having crossed, will move on the Jacobs' Ford and Robertson's Tavern road, and take post on the right of the Second Corps, on the road from Raccoon Ford to Robertson's Tavern, covering the right from approach in the direction of Bartlett's Mills.}

From the reports received from the commander of the leading division and my staff officers, I was satisfied that to move forward in the order of march prescribed in the orders issued by me on the 23d instant (appended, marked D), would subject the column to an attack on its hank before it could extricate itself from the woods, and I felt myself compelled to maneuver from the rear of my column to the left, while the head of the column held its position near the Raccoon Ford road.

This embarrassment I early communicated to the general commanding, and was directed b) dispatch, dated 11.15 a.m.:

_{If you cannot unite with General Warren by the route you are on, you must move through to him by the left.}

And again, at 1.45 p.m.:

_{Your dispatch of 11.45 is received. The major-general commanding directs that you attack the enemy in your front immediately, throwing your left forward so as to connect with General Warren at Robertson's Tavern. The object of an attack is to form a junction with General Warren, which must be effected immediately.}

Up to this time my efforts had been directed to ascertain the practicability of forcing my head of the column through the opposition in its front. I now directed my order of battle, causing the Third Division to extend on the left of the Second Division, which was already halted and deployed. While the Third Division was taking position, the enemy were found posted toward the left and forming line of battle in that direction. This division was soon closely engaged, as will be seen by the report of General Carr. The enemy were repeatedly driven back, particularly in front of Morris' and Kiefer's brigades.

At about 3 o'clock I ordered the First Division (Birney's) into the second line to support the Third Division (Carr's), which relieved that line about 4 o'clock. The enemy apparently heavily re-en-forced made a simultaneous attack upon the right and left flanks of the line. At this time I had thrown into position Battery K, Fourth Artillery, on the left of a section of guns already placed there by the commander of the Second Division, which in a few minutes afterward was charged very fiercely, but the enemy were repulsed with great loss. Shortly after reforming it was again attacked with the same result. The Second Division now moved forward, took and maintained the ground yielded, as did the division on the left. A desultory firing was kept up until some time after dark, on both sides, when it ceased. Our pickets were thrown forward across the battlefield, those on the right on the Raccoon Ford road, and those on the left to a point about 1 ½ miles from Robertson's Tavern.

Toward the close of the engagement, and when the pressure seemed heaviest upon my flanks, I called upon General Sedgwick to re-enforce them, which he promptly did, but the enemy had retired, and his troops were not engaged. The reason that the repulse of the enemy was not closely followed up was in consequence of the ammunition not being able to reach the field until late in the day, from the same causes which retarded the movements of the artillery.

From prisoners who were taken during the battle it was ascertained that Johnson's division was the first in position to oppose the march, and that it was afterward re-enforced previous to the fierce attacks at 4 p.m., by Rodes' division, and that General Lee had arrived upon the field and directed the column, whose assault was repulsed by the batteries on my right. That there were two divisions of the enemy in my front is confirmed by the reports of citizens to officers of the Sixth Corps, which took the position on the 28th assigned to the Third Corps for the 27th, in your circular of the 23d ultimo.

It will thus be seen that the field upon which the battle was fought was the same as that upon which we would have been obliged to fight had I taken up the place designated in the circular above referred to, except that instead of deploying from rear to front, I should have had to deploy disadvantageously from left to right.

The conduct of the officers and men of the Third Corps engaged deserves the highest commendation. Opposed to the best troops of the rebel army, in superior numbers, and reduced by detachment, they maintained the high character which they have always held in the Army of the Potomac. The sanguinary loss of the enemy, and their repulse, leaving their dead and wounded in hospital upon the field, exhibit the prowess of the corps beyond any terms which it is in my power to express.

I respectfully refer you to the reports of the division commanders for the special mention of those most distinguished.

I desire especially to notice the manner in which the division commanders, Major-General Birney, Brigadier-General Prince, and Brigadier-General Carr, handled their respective divisions.

The difficulties presented by the topographical features of the country to the maneuvering of large masses of troops were very great. Necessarily I had to depend upon the intelligence and energy of those generals during the operations above recited. The embarrassments of the general commanding the leading division were great, but were relieved when the general commanding the army, made aware of my position, gave the order to attack. This was promptly responded to, and the divisions were put into action as they were respectively called upon in a manner reflecting great credit upon their commanders. The First Division, which had been held in reserve, threw itself into the front line at the opportune moment, deciding the fortunes of the day.

My personal and general staff were active, intelligent, and efficient.

The list of casualties was forwarded with the reports of division commanders. The loss of the enemy, as reported by various officers and corroborated by publications in the Southern press, far exceeded our own.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. H. FRENCH,
Major-General, Commanding.

Brig. Gen. S. WILLIAMS,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Army of Potomac.

[Indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
December 17, 1863.

Respectfully forwarded, with the request that this report may be placed with my report of the operations of the army during the recent movement across the Rapidan, which was transmitted to the Adjutant-General of the Army, December 7, 1863.

GEO. G. MEADE,
Major-General, Commanding.

[Inclosure A.]

Brigadier-General PRINCE,
Commanding Second Division:

GENERAL: You will move forward at daylight, in the same order as yesterday, keeping well closed up. You will throw out cavalry and infantry pickets upon all cross-roads. You will look well to your right flank, moving with a strong force of flankers well out.

By command of Major-General French:

O. H. HART,
Lieutenant-Colonel, and Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Inclosure B.]

Lieut. Col. O. H. HART,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Third Corps:

COLONEL: I have received an order from you to connect with the Second Corps, afterward an order to connect with the Sixth Corps. It is possible that the manner in which I shall establish my pickets will fulfill these orders, for I shall establish them correctly. At the same time, I do not see that I shall be able to accomplish either of those objects.

In my march here I have kept the left-hand road all the time, and followed the map which was furnished me from your headquarters. In doing so I came upon the cavalry pickets of the enemy, and drove them over an opening of about three-fourths of a mile, my skirmishers wading a deep creek in the middle of it. From this opening the smoke of the enemy's camps on the plank road on my left and front was dense (5 miles off), but I learn from the citizen who lives in this opening that Jones' [Johnson's] division is about :3 miles in my front, and that the road to Robertson's Tavern makes a strong angle to the rear from the point at which I am encamped. I picket that road strongly, and my camp is arranged with reference to an attack from that quarter as well as from the front.

Yours, &c.,

HENRY PRINCE,
Brigadier-General.

[Inclosure C.]

HEADQUARTERS SECOND DIVISION, THIRD CORPS,
November 26 [27?], 1863.

Col. O. H. HART:

COLONEL: I have watched a light which an old negro informs me is upon Rhodes' Hill, immediately the other side of Bartlett's Mill. The road which goes over the summit of the hill leads by the Zoar meeting house to Verdierville. With my opera-glass I could see constant movements to the left (or motions). The view was so dispersed by the trunks of the trees that I could not make out any of the objects. I saw this continuously for an hour and a half, when the light went down quite low, and I returned to camp.

The Raccoon Ford road crosses the road from here to Robertson's Tavern a mile and a half from here. The path to Flat Run Church turns out beyond this crossing; therefore I have not sent to communicate that way. Our army guides have no information of the country this side of the Rapidan. It is called 4 miles from here to Robertson's Tavern.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

HENRY PRINCE,
Brigadier-General.

P. S.--I consider the indication to be that the enemy is moving to Orange Court-House.

[Inclosure D.]

HEADQUARTERS THIRD ARMY CORPS,
November 23, 1863.

Pursuant to orders from headquarters Army of the Potomac, the Third Corps will move to-morrow morning, November 24, 1863, upon the Rapidan at Jacobs' Mills, Second Division, Third Division, First Division, left in front.

Second Division: The order of march will be: one regiment, one section of rifled guns, pontoon train, the remainder of the brigade, battery of light twelves, remainder of division, remainder of rifle battery.

Third Division and one battery.
First Division and one battery.
Reserve artillery.

Upon approaching the ford, the commanding officer of the leading division will throw out one brigade toward Mitchell's Ford on his right, covering the roads on the flank in that direction. He will push forward the leading brigade. If the passage is seriously resisted, he will force the passage by placing his batteries in position and throwing troops in boats to the other side.

The other division commanders will move their infantry outside of the road, leaving it open for artillery and such vehicles as are mentioned in general orders. Upon approaching the ford, they will prepare for resistance from the right.

After crossing the ford the leading division commander will take such position (in the absence of specific orders from the corps commander) as will enable the other divisions to cross. Their positions will be relieved successively until the Sixth Corps crosses, when all of the corps will proceed, by the route indicated on the map, toward Robertson's Tavern.

Each division must adhere to the three-line formation, first and second lines deployed, third line in column of attack, ready to move to any point. Division commanders will connect with each other toward the ford if attacked.

It is the intention of the corps commander (in the absence of instructions to the contrary) to keep his corps in the advance, should the dispositions of the enemy, forewarned, make it practicable.

The chief of artillery will select such positions for his batteries at the ford as may be necessary--also as the troops advance--demanding an adequate support from the nearest division commander.

The headquarters of the corps will be at the ford near Jacobs' Mills.

Division commanders will be careful to have their pioneers in front in readiness for duty on the road when called upon.

By command of Major-General French:

O. H. HART,
Lieutenant-Colonel, and Assistant Adjutant-General.

Commanding Officer Third Corps

The major-general commanding directs me to say that the delay in the movements of your corps on the 26th and 27th ultimo, and its failure to reach the point designated for it near Robertson's Tavern on the 27th, calls for an investigation as to their cause.

Through the delays and failures specified, an opportunity was lost of attacking the enemy before he had concentrated. This had a powerful influence upon the result of the movement of this army.

The major-general commanding therefore requests a full explanation of all the facts and circumstances which in any way bear upon the causes of the delays and failures referred to.

A. A. HUMPHREYS,
Major-General, and Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD ARMY CORPS,
December 8, 1863.

Major-General HUMPHREYS,

Chief of Staff:

GENERAL: In reply to your note of this date, in which you state that my report of the operations of the Third Corps during the recent movements of the army is unsatisfactory and will be made the subject of official investigation, I desire to state that so far as my own conduct is concerned I have no apprehensions of the result.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. H. FRENCH,
Major-General.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD ARMY CORPS,
January 8, 1864.

Brig. Gen. S. WILLIAMS,
Asst. Adjt. Gen., Hdqrs. Army of the Potomac'

GENERAL: Inclosed is a copy of the New York Tribune of the 7th instant, to which I respectfully invite the attention of the major-general commanding the army to request to be informed whether the statement made by a Rev. Mr, Hall, set forth in the paragraph marked, particularly that italicized, were furnished and sanctioned by him.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

[Inclosure.]

GENERAL MEADE'S ACCOUNT OF HIS RETREAT.

The Rev. S. A. Hall, of Dover, N.H., recently visited the Army of the Potomac and called upon General Meade. He writes to a New Hampshire paper that he asked General Meade to explain his last campaign, and the general was kind enough to do so, as follows:

_{I went over the river to right, and if my orders had been obeyed, I am confident that Lee's army might have been defeated. My plan was to cross at Germanna Ford, take the road to Orange Court-House, and push on rapidly. If Lee should send forces to stop me, to attack him in force and destroy that portion of his army before he could concentrate the whole of it to oppose me, But one of my corps commanders failed me. He was commanded to march at 6 o'clock in the morning, but did not move until 8 o'clock. He was directed, if Lee sent forces to oppose him, to attack at once. Lee did send Ewell down the Orange Court-House road, just as I expected, but my general stood and looked at him all day and did not fight. So we lost twenty-four hours, and that gave Lee notice and time to concentrate his army, and take so strong a position that it could not be carried without great loss and a risk of losing our army. Such aright would have damaged us and encouraged the rebels, and prolonged the war, and I gave the order to retreat. The corps commander referred to was General French, who was probably too drunk to know or do his duty.}

---

JANUARY 8, 1864.
Commanding Officer Third Corps:

I am directed by the commanding general to acknowledge the receipt of your note of this date, inclosing a copy of the New York Tribune, and calling his attention to an article therein.

The commanding general desires me to say to you that he has no recollection of ever having had any conversation with the Rev. Mr. Hall, though, as he receives numerous visitors, it is not impossible this gentleman may have called on him. The commanding general is, however, quite positive he never authorized that part of the article in italics, nor does the rest of the article accurately convey his views; if, however, the commanding general had any conversation with Mr. Hall, he thinks it probable may have told him what he has officially reported to the War Department, that it was the delay in the movements of the Third Corps, and particularly the failure to effect a junction at Robertson's Tavern on the 27th of November, which was one of the primary causes of the failure of the recent movement across the Rapidan.

The commanding general presumes this statement will not be a surprise to you, inasmuch as he directed Major-General Humphreys, chief of staff, to inform you officially that your explanation of the delay in the movements of the Third Corps was not satisfactory, and that the matter would have to be the subject of official investigation.

Very respectfully, &c.,

CAMP AT BRANDY STATION,
December 3, 1863

LIEUTENANT: I have the honor to report the movements and operations of my command from November 26, 1863, to this date, as required by circular orders of this date from division headquarters. The command marched from Brandy Station at 8 a.m., November 26, and arrived at Jacobs' Ford, on the Rapidan River, at 2 p.m. Before starting from Brandy Station, 200 men were detailed from the One hundred and tenth Ohio Infantry, under command of Maj. O. H. Binkley, as corps train guard. About 4 p.m. the troops crossed the ford and marched about 3 miles on a road leading to the turnpike road from Orange Court-House to Fredericksburg. The troops were then counter-marched to within 14 miles of the ford, where they bivouacked for the night. My brigade marched in the rear of the Third Brigade, which was the advance of the division on that day.

The march was resumed at 7 a.m., November 27, and toward the turnpike road above named. On this day the First Brigade was in advance of the division and the Second Brigade marched in its rear. Brisk firing commenced in the advance about 12 m., between the enemy and the Second Division of the Third Corps. After some delay my brigade was ordered by Brigadier-General Carr into the woods, with directions to form upon the left of the First Brigade, commanded by Brigadier-General Morris. On account of the density of the undergrowth in the woods and the absence of roads, it was with some difficulty that I succeeded in reaching the position designated.

Upon arriving in the vicinity of the enemy's fire, I discovered they occupied a hill to my front upon the slope of which were posted the troops of General Morris' brigade. I determined at once to carry the hill and occupy it, deeming it the only defensible position that could then be taken. As I was marching my troops by the left flank, and along the hollow behind the hill, I ordered the two advance regiments (One hundred and tenth and One hundred and twenty-second Ohio), as soon as they had become unmasked, upon General Morris' left, to move by the right flank, in line of battle, carry the crest of the hill, and take post behind a fence upon its summit. The Sixth Maryland and One hundred and thirty-eighth Pennsylvania Infantry Regiments were ordered to file in rear of the two Ohio regiments, and take position upon their left, from right to left, in the order named. The hill was carried and the fence gained with but slight loss. On account of misunderstanding an order, the One hundred and twenty-second and One hundred and tenth Ohio Regiments momentarily fell back a short distance, but, upon being ordered back, retook their position and became immediately engaged with a heavy force of the enemy.

The right of the brigade was found to be in advance of the First Brigade, leaving it in great danger of being turned by the enemy. I promptly reported this fact to General Morris, and urged him to advance his line, and also occupy the crest of the hill, which he did after a slight delay. The Ohio regiments maintained their position until near dark, when, their ammunition becoming exhausted, they were relieved. The Sixth Maryland was under a heavy fire from the commencement of the action until near its close, and maintained its ground gallantly.

Two assaults were made upon my line, the first in front of the Sixth Maryland and the second in front of the One hundred and thirty-eighth Pennsylvania. The enemy was formed in columns of attack not less than three regiments deep. He was both times repulsed, with very heavy loss. During these assaults Cols. John W. Horn, of the Sixth Maryland, and M. R. McClennan, of the One hundred and thirty-eighth Pennsylvania Infantry Regiments distinguished themselves by their superior courage and gallantry.

The Sixth Maryland remained in its position until the battle was about ended. It was relieved about 6 p.m. Its supply of ammunition was also exhausted. The One hundred and thirty-eighth Pennsylvania was withdrawn at night, and after the close of the engagement. The brigade bivouacked for the night a short distance to the rear of the battle-ground. The men were supplied with ammunition immediately upon their withdrawal.

The enemy's loss in my front was very heavy. His killed and wounded were left upon the field.

During the engagement, with rare exceptions, the officers and men behaved gallantly and deserve high commendation. I take pleasure in mentioning the uniform good conduct of Col. W. H. Ball, One hundred and twenty-second Ohio; Lieut. Col. W. N. Foster, One hundred and tenth Ohio; Col. J. W. Horn, Sixth Maryland, and Col. M. R. McClennan, One hundred and thirty-eighth Pennsylvania Infantry, regimental commanders. They remained at their posts, and with skill and bravery urged on their men. Lieut. Col. M.M. Granger, Maj. J. C. Hill, Captains Sells, Ross, Cornyn, Guss, Walter, Stewart, Prentiss, Bradshaw, Martin, Beaver, Rouzer, Spangler, Moore, McElwain, and many others deserve high commendation.

Colonel McClennan was severely wounded in the foot late in the action, and was obliged to leave the field. Lieut. James A. Fox, One hundred and tenth Ohio Infantry, was killed. He commanded a company, and, as upon former occasions, distinguished himself. He rose from the ranks to his position in the army. He was not only brave, but an accomplished gentleman and soldier. He commanded the esteem of all who knew him. His loss will be deeply deplored by his many friends. The total killed in my brigade was 1 officer and 32 enlisted men; wounded, 7 officers and 137 enlisted men. A list of the casualties by regiments is hereto appended.

On the morning of the 28th, the enemy having retreated, the brigade was marched to a point between the plank and turnpike roads leading from Fredericksburg to Orange Court-House. A short halt was made near Robertson's Tavern. The troops were put in position facing the enemy, where he was strongly posted behind Mine Run, between us and Orange Court-House and covering the two roads named. The troops bivouacked in their position until 2 p.m., November 29, when my brigade, under the direction of Brigadier-General Carr, was formed for an attack in line of battle, and in the rear of the Third Brigade, Third Division, Third Army Corps (Colonel Smith). The attack was not made.

At 4 a.m., November 30, was marched to the left upon the plank road and again formed as before, for an attack, which was again abandoned. About 2 p.m. the brigade, with the other troops of the division, was marched to its late position near the center of the whole line. The troops bivouacked in this position until 7 p.m., December 1, 1863, when orders were received from Brigadier-General Carr to march in advance of the division. The troops marched to the Rapidan River, and crossed at Culpeper Ford about 4 a.m., December 2. The march was resumed about 12 m. toward Brandy Station. The troops bivouacked about sundown near Richardsville. At 12 o'clock midnight the march was resumed for Brandy Station, at which place the brigade arrived about 6 a.m., December 3, and went into camp, where it still remains.

During the march temporary delays were occasioned by getting upon the wrong road, and also by artillery and teams stalling on bad roads. This latter was particularly the case upon the march to Culpeper Ford, on the night of the 1st instant.

On the entire campaign my orders were received from Brigadier-General Carr, commanding division.

I beg further to report that many sick were conveyed from Brandy Station in ambulances, to their great injury and the inconvenience of the troops. The ambulances being required for the conveyance of the wounded, many of these men, although unable to perform the day and night marches, had to be sent to their regiments.

The wounded received all possible care and attention at the hands of the medical officers. Surg. C. P. Harrington, chief surgeon of the brigade, Assistant Surgeons Richards, Bryant, Owen, Cady, Thornton, and Foreman, were actively engaged in the care of the wounded. The last named remained upon the field during the engagement of the 27th of November, and amid the danger rendered important service to the severely wounded.

In conclusion, I beg to acknowledge the important service rendered by Lieut. William A. Hathaway, acting assistant adjutant-general, Lieut. Samuel J. Yarger, acting assistant inspector-general, and Lieuts. Thomas S. Black and E. S. Norvell, acting aides-de-camp on my staff. During the engagement they each displayed cool courage and excellent skill. For their prompt action in conveying orders upon the field, and skill exhibited in posting troops, I cannot too highly commend them. They also deserve commendation for their efficiency in the movement of troops, upon the march, during the entire campaign.

I am, lieutenant, with high esteem, your obedient and humble servant,

J. WARREN KEIFER,
Colonel, Commanding

Lieut. J. JOHNSON,
Acting Assistant Adjutant General